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PHIL IPP FRANK ’S AUSTRO-AMERICAN
LOGICAL EMPIRICISM
Thomas Mormann
The aim of this article is to discuss the “Austro-American” logical empiricism proposed
by physicist and philosopher Philipp Frank, particularly his interpretation of Carnap’s
Aufbau, which he considered the charter of logical empiricism as a scientific world con-
ception. According to Frank, the Aufbau was to be read as an integration of the ideas
of Mach and Poincaré, leading eventually to a pragmatism quite similar to that of the
American pragmatist William James. Relying on this peculiar interpretation, Frank in-
tended to bring about a rapprochement between the logical empiricism of the Vienna
Circle in exile and American pragmatism. In the course of this project, in the last years
of his career, Frank outlined a comprehensive, socially engaged philosophy of science
that could serve as a “link between science and philosophy.”
1. Introduction
In the past 3 or 4 decades, quite a few philosophers and historians of philos-
ophy of science have engaged in dissecting the various currents of epistemology
and philosophy of science that informed the logical empiricism of the Vienna
Circle. In this endeavor, neo-Kantian influenceswere initially distinguished from
philosophical doctrines attributed to a specific “Austrian philosophy” whose or-
igins are traced to nineteenth-century philosopher-scientists such as Bolzano,
Brentano, and Mach. The first to propose the thesis that there was a genuine
Austrian philosophical tradition in the larger context of German-speaking phi-
losophy was Otto Neurath. InThe Scientific Conception of theWorld: The Vienna
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Circle he characterized Austrian philosophy as anti-Kantian, science oriented,
clinging to the spirit of enlightenment, empiricist, and particularly interested
in questions of logic and language (Neurath 1929). Later, Neurath’s thesis was
elaborated by Rudolf Haller and others and is now known as the Neurath-Haller
thesis (see Neurath 1929; Haller 1991; Uebel 2003).
Although many members of the Vienna Circle, particularly Neurath and
Philipp Frank, can be characterized as Austrian philosophers in the sense of the
Neurath-Haller thesis, there were others who could not so easily be subsumed
under the Austrian label. Among them, Schlick and Carnap were the most im-
portant examples. The aim of this article is to discuss the bold attempt of the
Austrian philosopher Frank to read Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt as a
work in the tradition of Austrian philosophy in the sense of the Neurath-Haller
thesis (Carnap 1928/1967, henceforth Aufbau).
For some time, it has been nearly unanimously agreed that the Aufbau is
deeply marked by neo-Kantian, Kantian, and other non-Austrian influences.
This is not surprising; Carnap began his philosophical career in Jena as a neo-
Kantian, writing his dissertation under the direction of the neo-Kantian Bruno
Bauch.More importantly, the first version of theAufbauwas written in the years
1922–25, when he lived as an “independent scholar” in Buchenbach near Frei-
burg in Germany.1 Thus, the first version of the Aufbau was written before
Carnap came to Vienna. Hence, what is surprising, at least in light of the
Neurath-Haller thesis, is that the Austrians welcomed the Aufbau as congenial
with the Circle’s allegedly Austrian philosophy.
Indeed, at least for a certain time, the Aufbau became the philosophical
reference point of the Austrian “scientific world conception.” This point was
emphatically formulated by Frank:2 “Carnap gave the new philosophy [i.e., log-
ical empiricism of the Vienna Circle] its ‘classical shape.’He coined many of its
terms and phrases and endowed it with subtlety and simplicity. . . . In . . . The
Logical Structure of the World [sic] the integration of Mach and Poincaré was
actually performed in a coherent system of conspicuous logical simplicity. Our
Viennese group saw in Carnap’s work the synthesis that we had advocated for
many years” (1949, 33). Carnap himself did not pay much attention to the
originality of Austrian philosophy.3 In Logical Syntax of Language (Carnap
1937a), as well as in later texts after he had left Europe, Austrian philosophers
1. When Carnap lived in Buchenbach, he came into contact with Husserl’s phenomenology. The
influence of Husserl’s phenomenology on the Aufbau is well confirmed (see Mayer 1991).
2. Frank did not take Carnap’s non-Austrian philosophical heritage seriously, debunking it as “some
sentimental ties to traditional German philosophy” (1949, 34).
3. He never dealt with Bolzano, and Brentano is mentioned in the Aufbau only once as the founder
of “the traditional theory of intentionality” (Carnap 1928/1967, sec. 164).
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were not mentioned at all (with the exception of Wittgenstein and Popper).4
Even for the Aufbau, he did not get it exactly right when he retrospectively de-
scribed Mach’s role for this work as follows:
The choice of a phenomenalist basis [for the constitution system mainly
dealt with in the Aufbau5] was influenced by some radical empiricist or
positivist German [sic] philosophers of the end of the last century whom I
had studied with interest, in the first place Ernst Mach, and further
Richard Avenarius, Richard von Schubert-Soldern, andWilhelm Schuppe.
For the constitution of scientific concepts on the phenomenal basis I
found fruitful suggestions in the works of Mach and Avenarius, and,
above all, in the logical constructions made by Russell. (Carnap 1963, 18)
He was apparently unaware of the importance of distinguishing between Aus-
trian and German philosophy, drawing his inspiration from wherever he could
find it, whether Austrian, German, or British sources.6 Striking evidence for this
eclectic attitude was his confession that the Aufbau’s constitution theory had
two very different sources: “Two entirely different and frequently hostile phil-
osophical positions have the merit of both having discovered the necessary basis
of the constitution system. Positivism has emphasized that the only material of
cognition consists in the undigested experientially given. It is here that we have
to look for the basic elements of the constitution system. Transcendental ideal-
ism, especially the neo-Kantian school (Rickert, Cassirer, Bauch) has justly em-
phasized that these elements do not suffice. Order concepts, our basic relations,
must be added” (Carnap 1928/1967, sec. 75).
Although Carnap acknowledged having been influenced by Poincaré, he con-
sidered Russell’s influence farmore important, as will be discussed in some detail
in section 3. This evidence does not imply that Frank’s Austrian reading of the
Aufbau as an “integration of Mach and Poincaré” was mistaken. Carnap might
have arrived at some sort of “Austrian philosophy” independently, starting from
a “German” philosophical base. Nevertheless, the Aufbau, at least prima facie,
4. Further evidence that Mach only played a minor role for Carnap is that he was never mentioned
in Carnap’s pre-Aufbau articles, with one or two exceptions that lack importance. With the shifting of
emphasis toward logic and language from the thirties onward, Machian ingredients in Carnap’s em-
piricism faded away.
5. In the Aufbau, he was more critical of Mach’s phenomenalism, noting that a Machian consti-
tution system did not satisfy the requirement of “epistemic primacy” in contrast to the gestaltist system
based on Elementarerlebnisse (see Carnap 1928/1967, sec. 54).
6. In fact, Schubert-Soldern may be characterized as an Austrian philosopher (born in Prague).
Avenarius is sometimes considered a “German-Swiss” thinker.
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poses a problem for the Neurath-Haller thesis because it challenges the con-
traposition of German neo-Kantian and Austrian anti-Kantian philosophy. The
Aufbau demonstrates that Kant’s shadow loomed larger than many Austrian
philosophers might have thought.
Frank, as an Austrian philosopher par excellence, never acknowledged that
Kant and other German philosophical traditions had any importance for the
Aufbau. As he showed in his Historical Background, he wholeheartedly sub-
scribed to Neurath’s bold thesis that “things happen in Austria parallel to what
happens in Warsaw, Cambridge, or Paris, rather than to what takes place in
Berlin” (Frank 1949, 47).7
According to the Neurath-Haller thesis, a characteristic trait of Austrian phi-
losophy was its openness to non-German philosophical and scientific traditions,
particularly French conventionalism and American pragmatism (see Neurath
1929; Frank 1949). This claim is certainly true for Frank. Since his philosoph-
ical youth in the “first Vienna Circle” (“Proto-Circle”) in the early years of the
twentieth century, Frank was eagerly engaged in absorbing the philosophical
doctrines of Poincaré, Duhem, and other French conventionalists, as well as the
American pragmatism of William James (see Frank 1949; Uebel 2003). These
components played an important role in Frank’s reading of the Aufbau and ren-
dered it a typical Austrian reading, or so he argued.
The outline of this article is as follows. To set the stage, section 2 outlines
Frank’s philosophical background,8 with special attention to its phenomenal-
ist, conventionalist, and pragmatist ingredients. These philosophical currents
strongly influenced Frank’s interpretation of the Aufbau and provided it with
a specific Austro-American flavor. In section 3, Frank’s interpretation is briefly
compared with some contemporary readings of this work. In section 4, we con-
sider in detail what may have been the most peculiar feature of Frank’s general
philosophical outlook, namely, his pronounced aversion to “school philosophy.”
Notwithstanding that Frank had already been engaged in a fight against “school
philosophy” in the early 1930s, long before he emigrated to the United States,
this aspect of his philosophical work became particularly visible in the last period
7. It seems that Neurath and Frank never came to realize that what happened in Göttingen,
Marburg, Jena, or Freiburg might have been philosophically more important than what happened in
Berlin.
8. Most of Frank’s early philosophical papers are collected in Modern Science and Its Philosophy
(1949), and some can be found in Between Physics and Philosophy (1941). Often, these papers were
published for the first time in the early decades of the twentieth century, and the original sources are
sometimes difficult to find. Thus, the page numbers of the papers quoted are not from the original
publications but from Frank (1949). For instance, “(Frank 1930/1949, 102)” refers to page 102 of
Frank (1949) of a paper originally published in 1930. The introduction Historical Background of
Modern Science and Its Philosophy, originally published in 1949, is referred to as “(Frank 1949).”
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of his career when he struggled against American neo-Thomists. In section 5,
we discuss the vicissitudes of Frank’s “pragmatism of an enlightened and so-
cially engaged physicist” (as his wider philosophical project may be character-
ized) within the context of midcentury American pragmatism. Section 6 ad-
dresses Frank’s attempts to conceive of science as a subsystem of society and to
determine its relation to ethics, politics, and religion. This approach led him
to conceptualize philosophy of science as “a link between science and philoso-
phy” (see Frank 1957/1962).
2. Frank’s Philosophical Background
Frank was not a professional philosopher interested in discussing hairsplitting
philosophical, logical, and philological nuances. Rather, he considered himself
a philosophizing scientist in the tradition of philosopher-scientists such as Poin-
caré, Duhem, Mach, Boltzmann, and Einstein, all of whom he addressed over
the decades in various contributions (see Frank 1949). Frank was a committed
philosopher and scientist who did not care much for subtle distinctions. Con-
sequently, he interpreted those philosophical accounts he considered useful for
his purposes in a rather liberal manner, to put it mildly. Hence, his adaptions
of phenomenalism, conventionalism, and pragmatism do not always closely re-
semble the accounts of the philosophical currents that result from more careful
modern interpretations. As Uebel put it, “For Frank, ‘phenomenalism,’ ‘con-
ventionalism,’ and ‘pragmatism’ were not neutral philosophical terms,” but “ban-
ners, self-consciously flown to mark the Circle’s Frontstellung in the battle
against metaphysics” (Uebel 2004, 261). Throughout his life, Frank considered
himself a faithful follower of Mach (see Frank 1949).9 For him, Mach was the
“real master of the Vienna Circle” (Frank 1938b/1949, 79). Hence, it is ap-
propriate to begin the presentation of Frank’s philosophical background with
Mach.10 For Frank, Mach, as a philosopher, was best characterized as a phe-
nomenalist. Roughly, phenomenalism may be understood as the claim that the
world consists of sensations or phenomena. Mach often called them “elements”
to avoid too narrow psychological connotations.11 Frank took the Machian “el-
ements” or “phenomena” as empirical experiences. Phenomena were the source
of evidence in whatever field we may inquire, not speculation or a priori insight.
9. Bolzano and Brentano played no role for him, and Boltzmann as a philosopher is mentioned only
in passing as Mach’s adversary in matters of atomism.
10. For a thorough discussion of Mach’s philosophy and its impact on logical empiricism, see Banks
(2003).
11. Banks argued that Mach believed in “observer-independent elements in matter all the way from
1863 to 1916” (2003, 7).
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Science was understood as an attempt to provide useful descriptions of relevant
“complexes of the elements and their changes.” These were expressed in terms
of functional dependencies in the most economical, comprehensive, and simple
manner possible. For this task, one had to introduce appropriate “auxiliary
concepts,” such as “body,” “substance,” “individual,” and “atom,”whichwere not
to be understood as a priori categories but as instruments useful in some limited
contexts. Ignoring their provisional character could harm the progress of science
by smuggling in metaphysical pseudo-questions.
For Frank, the main value of Mach’s phenomenalist doctrines was that they
provide the means “for defending the edifice of physics against (metaphysical)
attacks from outside” (1917/1949, 67). For empirical science,Machian elements
had a function analogous to that of natural numbers in Leopold Kronecker’s
reductionist account of mathematics, according to which all statements of math-
ematics could be reduced to statements about natural numbers, at least in prin-
ciple (66). Machian phenomenalism admonished us to be aware of the limita-
tions and the provisional character of all auxiliary concepts. Knowledge that could
not be cashed out in terms of phenomenal knowledge, at least in principle, was
considered a metaphysical blunder. Thus, for a Machian, all empirical knowl-
edge was knowledge about phenomena, just as for Kronecker all mathematical
knowledge was knowledge about natural numbers.
Based on this antimetaphysical stance of Mach’s theory of elements, Frank
consideredMach the most important philosopher of enlightenment in the nine-
teenth century.Mach’s primarymerit was to note that enlightenmentwas a never-
ending process; each historical époque had to overcome the auxiliary concepts
of its predecessor and formulate its own new conceptualizations of the world
that would inexorably fall prey to new conceptual systems of subsequent gen-
erations. This restless spirit of permanent enlightenment kept science and sci-
entific philosophy alive, saving it from degenerating into a new scholasticism.
The emphasis on the purely instrumental character of all theories led Frank
to conventionalism, wherein he mainly relied on Poincaré, Duhem, and, to a
lesser extent, Abel Rey. Since the days of the “Proto-Circle,” Frank considered
the French conventionalists allies in the struggle against “school philosophy.”
Poincaré was the first to note that the principles of physics often contained con-
cepts defined by these very same principles. In such cases, the principles could
never be tested against experience because they were definitions in disguise, or,
as Poincaré used to say, “conventions.” Examples of such principles were the law
of conservation of energy and the law of inertia. Frank considered his book Das
Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen a contribution to a conventionalist philosophy of
science in Poincaré’s sense because it showed that the law of causality was also a
convention (Frank 1932/1998).
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Frank conceived of the philosophy of the Vienna Circle as a new philo-
sophical frame in which Mach’s phenomenalism was embedded in such a way
that its empiricist virtues were maintained and its logicality was improved,
mainly by the conventionalists’ detailed investigations of how mathematics
played a role in economically organizing the phenomena. In line withMach and
the French conventionalists, Frank insisted that an empirical theory did not
describe (a part of ) the world as it really was, nor did it offer explanations in
the sense of giving the “real causes” of events. Rather, an empirical theory was
to provide mathematical models useful for the comprehensive and economical
description of phenomena. Frank considered Poincaré’s conventionalist con-
tribution to a modern empiricism to be so important that he envisaged logical
empiricism as an integration of Mach and Poincaré:
I soon realized that any advance in the philosophy of science would con-
sist in setting up a theory in which the views of Mach and Poincaré would
be two special aspects of one more general view. To summarize these two
theories in a single sentence, one might say: According to Mach the gen-
eral principles of science are abbreviated economical descriptions of ob-
served facts; according to Poincaré they are free creations of the human
mind which do not tell anything about the observed facts. The attempt
to integrate the two concepts into one coherent system was the origin of
what was later called Logical Empiricism. (1949, 11–12)
The third ingredient of Frank’s philosophical Weltauffassung was pragma-
tism. In some sense, pragmatism may be said to be the first modern philo-
sophical current that did not arise in Europe and then spread to the rest of the
world; rather, pragmatism first arose in North America and spread to Europe.
It was, of course, not a monolithic doctrine. One may distinguish at least two
pragmatisms: the “hard” semiotic pragmatism of Peirce and the “soft” prag-
matism made famous by James and further developed by Dewey (see Mounce
1997). Frank subscribed to a version of James’s soft pragmatism. For him, the
core of the pragmatist account was a behaviorist theory of meaning according
to which “the meaning of any statement was given by its ‘cash value,’ that is,
by what it meant as a direction for human behavior” (Frank 1949, 33).12 If a
statement did not provide such a direction, it was meaningless. Understanding
meaningfulness in this way, Frank was led to the following interpretation of
12. It may be noted that the idea that the meaning of a concept is ultimately determined by its
experiential “cash value” was also adopted by Carnap in his Von Gott und Seele. Scheinfragen in
Metaphysik und Theologie (1928/2004, 59, 62).
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James’s pragmatic theory of truth: “According to James, the truth of a system of
principles—a physical theory, for instance—does not consist in its being a
faithful copy of reality, but rather in its allowing us with the help of these
principles to change our experiences according to our wishes. According to this
view, which essentially agrees with that of Mach, but rejects even more bluntly
the truth concept of the school philosophy, every solution of a problem is the
construction of a procedure that can be of use to us in the ordering and mas-
tering of our experiences” (Frank 1930/1949, 101). The insight attributed to
James that a physical theory does not yield a faithful copy of reality is not new at
all. It can be traced back to Kant (see Kritik der reinen Vernunft A318/B375),
and the neo-Kantians made much of it (see Cassirer 1910/1985). In other
words, by contrasting a pragmatist and a correspondence theory of truth in a
rather simplified manner, Frank construed an opposition of the “scientific world
conception” and “school philosophy” that hardly existed in such a clear-cut
manner. In a similar vein, Frank’s claim that James rejected the truth concept
of “school philosophy” tout court needs qualification.13 James’s account of truth
was by no means as simplistic as Frank contended (see James 1911/1997).
Moreover, in some sense, Carnap had become an adherent of a correspondent-
ist account of truth when he subscribed to Tarskian semantics in themid-1930s.
In contrast, neo-Kantians such as Cassirer dismissed any correspondence the-
ory of truth (Cassirer 1910/1985). In short, the issue of truth was more com-
plex than Frank wanted his readers to believe.
Summarizing, one may say that Frank harbored a rather idiosyncratic idea
of James’s pragmatism, marked by his intention to use it as a device against
“school philosophy.”His adaption of James’s pragmatism exemplifies his strong
inclination to draw sharp boundaries between “school philosophy” and “sci-
entific philosophy,” even where such neat boundary lines did not exist.
Whereas pragmatism and its theory of truth might have been a new game
for philosophers at the beginning of the twentieth century, for scientists, ac-
cording to Frank, the pragmatist theory of truth was nothing new: “The phys-
icist in his own scientific activity has never employed any other concept of truth
than that of pragmatism. . . . In practice we encounter only experiences, never
an object; hence nothing can be compared with an object. Actually, the phys-
icist compares only experiences with experiences. . . . This procedure, which
13. In some sense, James accepted the traditional definition of truth as “adaequatio rei et
intellectus,” as evidenced by the following quote from his Theory of Truth: “Truth is a property of certain
of our ideas. It means their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement, with reality. Pragmatists and
intellectualists [James’s expression for the partisans of “traditional philosophy”] both accept this defi-
nition as a matter of course” (1911/1997, ix). In contrast to “school philosophy,” however, James and
other pragmatists asked what the meanings of “reality” and “agreement” were (see Putnam 1997).
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the physicist is accustomed to use in his work, has been made by Mach and
James into a general conception of the criteria of truth” (1930/1949, 102).
Hence, according to Frank, pragmatism could also be regarded as a promising
candidate for a truly scientific philosophy in the sense of being in line with
scientists’ own philosophical convictions. Although Frank considered the prag-
matic account of meaningfulness and truth correct, he admitted that it might
look a bit murky from a logical point of view. He readily granted that “the old
logic” was not suitable to save James’s pragmatic account of truth. On the con-
trary, traditional logic might be considered one of the hirelings (as Frank in-
sinuated) of school philosophy; it was all too eager to refute the new account as
logically untenable. Fortunately, the new logic of Russell and Whitehead came
to the rescue: “the new logic of Russell and his school was suitable to help build
up the purely empirical, and hence still somewhat vague, conceptions of Mach
and James into a real system of the scientific world conception that was su-
perior to the school philosophy from the standpoint of formal logic as well”
(104).
Although the relational logic of Whitehead and Russell may be a useful tool
to render more precise the broadly relational stance of neutral monists such as
Mach, James, and Russell, this understanding did not exclude the fact that
these authors were strongly opposed with respect to other philosophical prob-
lems. For instance, Russell harshly criticized James’s pragmatic account of truth
as “silly,” and James responded to Russell’s criticism in a similar way (see Rus-
sell 1910; James 1911/1997). Frank tended to ignore such troubles, claiming
that there was “a close relationship between the truth concept of the modern
logical movement and that of pragmatism” (1930/1949, 112). Frank’s argu-
mentation for this claim was rather peculiar and relied on some far-fetched as-
sumptions. It brought into play the then-famous (or infamous) Ignorabimus
thesis of the German physiologist and philosopher Emil du Bois-Reymond,
according to which there existed some (meaningful) problems that science
would never be able to solve for principal reasons (“we shall never know”) (see
du Bois-Reymond 1882).
To argue for the affinity between pragmatism and the Aufbau, Frank first
assumed that in the Aufbau Carnap had shown that all relations between ob-
jects could be reduced to similarity relations between concrete experiences (see
Frank 1930/1949, 111).14 This entailed that every problem that could be for-
mulated in scientifically acceptable terms at all could be solved in principle be-
cause, in principle, it could be decided whether two experiences were similar.
14. Actually, Carnap had never shown anything like this. He simply assumed that a constitutional
system with a single binary relation (Ähnlichkeitserinnerung) sufficed for the constitution of the world.
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Thus, for a logically reconstructed world, du Bois-Reymond’s notorious Igno-
rabimus did not hold. All scientifically meaningful problems could be solved
scientifically—at least in principle. However, from a pragmatist point of view,
any Ignorabimus thesis was clearly meaningless. Hence, both the constitution
theory of the Aufbau and James’s pragmatism rejected du Bois-Reymond’s skep-
ticism. For Frank, this agreement sufficed to assert the following: “We see that
the consistent carrying through of a purely scientific world conception, as at-
tempted by Carnap, leads us just as far away from the ignorabimus as does the
pragmatism of James, which is thought out somewhat less logically but in its
tendencies has the same goal” (111).
Indeed, Frank explicitly asserted that the basic tendencies of James’s prag-
matism and Carnap’s constitutional theory coincided: “When I read [the
Aufbau] it reminded me strongly of William James’s pragmatic requirement,
that the meaning of any statement is given by its ‘cash value,’ that is, by what it
means as a direction for human behavior. I wrote immediately to Carnap, ‘What
you advocate is pragmatism.’ This was astonishing to him as it had been to me.
We noticed that our group, which lived in an environment of idealistic phi-
losophy, had eventually reached conclusions by which we could find kindred
spirits beyond the Atlantic in the United States” (1949, 33). Carnap never took
Frank’s hint seriously. His relation to American pragmatism remained luke-
warm. Although he paid some lip service to a close alliance between pragma-
tism and logical empiricism in Testability and Meaning (Carnap 1936, 1937b),
he did not heed Frank’s adhortations to more eagerly take into account the
pragmatic aspects of science (see Carnap 1963; Frank 1963). Rather, “going
pragmatic” remained a largely unrealized option of constitution theory and log-
ical empiricism.
For Frank and other members of the Vienna Circle, the refutation of du Bois-
Reymond’s Ignorabimus was characteristic of the “scientific world-conception.”
The authors of the Manifesto unequivocally decreed, “Neatness and clarity are
striven for, and dark distances and unfathomable depths are rejected. In sci-
ence there are no ‘depths’; there is surface everywhere: . . . The scientific
world-conception knows no unsolvable riddle” (Neurath 1929, 328; emphasis
in the original). In the last paragraph of the Aufbau, Carnap proposed a more
cautious formulation borrowed from the Tractatus (see Tractatus 6.52): “[For]
us there is no ‘Ignorabimus’; nevertheless, there are perhaps unsolvable riddles
of life. This is not a contradiction. Ignorabimus would mean: there are ques-
tions to which it is in principle impossible to find answers.However, the ‘riddles
of life’ arenot questions, but are practical situations” (Carnap1928/1967, sec. 183).
Similarly, mathematician, physicist, and philosopher Richard von Mises criti-
cized du Bois-Reymond’s Ignorabimus thesis as an artifact of bad metaphysics.
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According to him, “du Bois-Reymond’s ‘ignorabimus’ has no other significance
for us than the sober knowledge that the mathematician has of the impossi-
bility of squaring the circle and of other similar problems, which in being
brought to their proper form are at once settled and anulled” (von Mises 1930,
892). The rejection of the Ignorabimus was not, however, reliable evidence for
an anti-school-philosophical stance. For instance, the neo-Kantian Cassirer also
rejected du Bois-Reymond’s thesis (see Cassirer 1937).15 In any case, the logical
empiricists regarded the Ignorabimus as the gateway for all types of antiscientific
and metaphysical assertions of school philosophy. The alleged refutation of du
Bois-Reymond’s Ignorabimus in the Aufbau could also be used to put Mach’s
“instinctive aversion . . . to the use of vague terms such as ‘idealism’ or ‘mate-
rialism’ in science” on more solid ground (Frank 1938b/1949). Under the strict
scrutiny of modern logic, these terms turned out to be metaphysically con-
taminated—thus Mach’s “instinctively felt aversion”: “We can today formulate
in words, if we take the standpoint of logical empiricism, as it was formulated
very precisely in Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language and his paper ‘Testabil-
ity and Meaning’” (Frank 1938b/1949, 86). Frank never substantiated these
claims. Apparently, he alluded to the fact that both Mach and Carnap consid-
ered the question of whether an idealist or a realist epistemology is correct as a
pointless metaphysical pseudo-problem (see Carnap 1928/1967, sec. 175).
For Frank, philosophy of science was not a merely academic affair; phi-
losophy of science should contribute to the battle against metaphysical school
philosophy and its pernicious consequences for science and society. In the 1930s,
in Vienna as well as in Prague, philosophers who subscribed to a “scientific
conception of the world” were not only an academic minority; with some jus-
tification, they could also consider themselves an endangered species for rather
solid political and societal reasons. This situation also affected the philosophi-
cal style of Frank’s interpretation of the Aufbau. He did not write a scholarly
commentary on this work. Rather, his reading of the Aufbau must be recon-
structed from his remarks and observations in various philosophical articles
engaged in a struggle against metaphysical “school philosophy.” Or, expressed
positively, he wanted to contribute to a “new philosophy of science” envisaged
as an integration of “Mach and Poincaré” and improved by ingredients taken
from James’s pragmatism (see Frank 1949, 33). This understanding marked his
15. Perhaps the most vigorous rejection of the Ignorabimus was that of David Hilbert, who in 1930,
at the meeting of the German Mathematical Society in Königsberg, felt called to contradict du Bois-
Reymond: “We must not believe those, who today, with philosophical bearing and deliberative tone,
prophesy the fall of culture and accept the ignorabimus. For us there is no ignorabimus, and in my
opinion none whatever in natural science. In opposition to the foolish ignorabimus our slogan shall be:
Wir müssen wissen—wir werden wissen!” (Hilbert 1930, 963).
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reading of the Aufbau and his version of logical empiricism in general.16 As he
explicitly recognized, the most determined attempt in this direction had been
undertaken by Carnap in the Aufbau (see Frank 1930/1949, 110–11).
3. Frank’s Reading of the Aufbau in Perspective
In the past 20 or 30 years, the Aufbau has been the target of much interpretative
work. The natural task then arises to compare Frank’s Austro-American read-
ing with at least some of the many interpretations of this work on the market.
Painting with a broad brush, we may roughly distinguish between two distinct
groups of interpretations:
i. Traditional interpretations read the Aufbau as the culmination of the
British empiricism of Locke and Hume, updated with the logic of
Whitehead and Russell.17
ii. Revisionist interpretations read the Aufbau as a work of German neo-
Kantianism that aimed to establish Konstitutionstheorie as a scientific
successor discipline to epistemology in the sense of traditional philos-
ophy.18
This dichotomic classification is, to be sure, quite rough. Recently, some in-
termediate interpretations have sought to do justice to both the empiricist and
neo-Kantian aspects of the Aufbau (see Pincock 2002; Tsou 2003).19 In con-
16. Actually, evidence for an important influence of Poincaré on the Aufbau is scarce. He is men-
tioned only four times (Carnap 1928/1967, sec. 3, 16, 124, 130), of which the last two lack importance.
In section 3, Carnap ascribed to him (and to Avenarius,Mach, andDriesch) the achievement of having at
least partially reduced “reality” to the “given.” According to Carnap, this was the first step toward the task
he was really interested in, namely, “to apply the theory of relations to the task of analyzing reality.” More
precisely, Poincaré had contributed to this task by noting that it is not the given itself but only the relations
between the sensations that have an objective value (see Carnap 1928/1967, sec. 16). In other words, in
the Aufbau, Poincaré is mentioned as a representative of a structuralist realism.
17. Quine’s classical interpretation succinctly asserts, “To account for the external world as a logical
construct of sense data, such, in Russell’s terms, was the program. It was Carnap, in his Der logische
Aufbau der Welt of 1928, who came nearest to executing it” (1969, 74).
18. See Richardson (1998) and Friedman (1999).
19. These authors recognize the importance of neo-Kantianism for the Aufbau but consider the
revisionist readings of the Aufbau incomplete because they unduly neglect the empiricist aspects of
Carnap’s project. Pincock argues that both the German and British readings misunderstood Russell’s
influence on the Aufbau project. If Pincock is right, this provides an argument against Frank’s interpre-
tation because Frank did not care much about Russell’s role in the Aufbau. Frank would have fared better
with Tsou, who considered the constitution theory of theAufbau an empiricistmethod of justification that
“aims to rationally justify concepts by showing how questions posed about them can be empirically
answerable” (2003, 680). This is more in line with the sense-data meaning theory Frank ascribed to the
Aufbau (see Frank 1949, 33).
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sideration of space, however, these new proposals cannot be discussed in detail
here.
For the sake of brevity, let us dub interpretations (i) and (ii) the British and
German readings of the Aufbau, respectively.20 At first approximation, the Aus-
trian reading may be characterized as a modified British reading in which the
empiricist ingredient of Hume was replaced by Mach and in which Russell’s
influence was downplayed in favor of French conventionalism. Nevertheless, I
think that with some good will, the Austrian and British readings of the Aufbau
could be rendered compatible with each other.
A reconciliation between the Austrian and German readings is more diffi-
cult. According to the German reading, the Aufbau is the first instance of a new
philosophical discipline called constitution theory (Konstitutionstheorie), en-
visaged by Carnap as a scientific successor discipline of traditional epistemol-
ogy and philosophy of science. Carnap designed constitution theory as a disci-
pline that was to be neutral with respect to the familiar quarrels among realism,
idealism, and empiricism that marked, for Frank, an insurmountable barrier
between “school philosophy” and the “scientific world conception.” Thus, for
Carnap, constitution theory had a much more general aim than to reconstruct
a system of scientific knowledge based onMach’s elements, as Frank contended.
This clearly transpires from his retrospective assessment of the Aufbau in his
Intellectual Autobiography:
When I developed the system of the Aufbau, it actually did not matter to
me which of the various forms of philosophical languages I used, because
to me they were merely modes of speech, and not formulations of posi-
tions. Indeed, in the book itself, in the description of the system . . . I used
in addition to the neutral language of symbolic logic three other lan-
guages. . . . The system of concepts was constructed on a phenomenalist
basis. . . . However, I indicated also the possibility of constructing a total
system of concepts on a physicalist basis. . . . My attitude was . . . ontolog-
ically neutral. For me it was simply a methodological question of choosing
themost suitable basis for the system to be constructed. . . . The ontological
theses of the traditional doctrines of either phenomenalism ormaterialism
remained for me entirely out of consideration. (Carnap 1963, 18)
If one so wishes, one may see in Carnap’s maxim of always “choosing the most
suitable basis for the system to be constructed” a kind of minimal pragmatism.
20. The best-known partisan of a British empiricist reading of the Aufbau is Quine. The protagonists
of a German neo-Kantian reading are Richardson (1998) and Friedman (1999).
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However, even under this assumption, Frank’s bold characterization of the
Aufbau as a (pragmatist) integration of Mach and Poincaré is incomplete, to put
it mildly. This is not to say, however, that Frank’s reading should be readily dis-
missed as obsolete. Rather, one should take into consideration that Frank’s pri-
mary interest was not that of performing the job of a meticulous historian of
philosophy faithful to the historical facts; rather, his “Austro-American” inter-
pretation of the Aufbau is to be considered an integral part of Frank’s larger
project of developing a scientific philosophy (or a philosophical science) that
overcame the separation between philosophy and science and avoided the de-
ficiencies of conventional philosophy: “How can we avoid the traditional am-
biguity and obscurity of philosophy? How can we bring about the closest
possible rapprochement between philosophy and science? By ‘science’we did not
mean ‘natural science’ only, but we included always social studies and the
humanities” (Frank 1949, 1). These general questions suggest a broader
perspective for assessing Frank’s interpretation of the Aufbau. Frank’s was a
“programmatic” interpretation, so to speak, and should be assessed accordingly
in light of the purposes and goals of this larger project in which Frank was
working. The main aim of Frank’s interpretation of the Aufbauwas to show that
Carnap’s philosophical approach and Frank’s own philosophical project of a
comprehensive, enlightenment-oriented, and committed scientific philosophy
fit well together.
Thus, to assess Frank’s “Austro-American reading,” it is expedient to not
only consider the ingredients of his philosophical Weltanschauung in a nar-
rower sense, such as Mach’s monistic phenomenalism, James’s pragmatism, and
French conventionalism, but also pay attention to a factor of a different type that
was particularly relevant for the committed character of Frank’s account, namely,
his “aversion against school philosophy.” This is the task of the next section.
4. “School Philosophy”
The sketch Frank provided in the introduction of his bookModern Science and
Its Philosophy (Frank 1949) regarding a fruitful collaboration among phenom-
enalism, conventionalism, and pragmatism as ingredients of a “new positivism”
contained much wishful thinking. It was less an objective description of facts
than a programmatically motivated intervention that intended to further a fu-
ture scientific philosophy that combined logical empiricism, pragmatism, and
possibly other progressive philosophical currents (see Uebel 2004). To better
understand this project, it is expedient to bring to the fore another factor of
Frank’s philosophical background that gave his approach its specific critical
flavor. This extra factor may be described as a general attitude that profoundly
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influenced Frank’s way of doing philosophy. Succinctly, it may be characterized
as a strong aversion against “school philosophy.” This attitude was one of the
invariants that marked Frank’s philosophy from its beginnings in Vienna and
Prague until its final period in Boston and Cambridge. The rejection of school
philosophy was the critical driving force behind Frank’s project of a committed
philosophy of science that aimed to contribute to the scientific, cultural, and
political progress of society as a whole. Thus, Frank’s philosophy of science fit
into the frame of the “scientific world conception” as outlined in theManifesto
(Neurath 1929).21 The core of Frank’s anti-school-philosophical attitude was
a radical Machian phenomenalism, according to which “the aim of natural sci-
ence is to obtain connections among phenomena. Theories, however, are like
withered leaves, which drop off after having enabled the organism of science
to breathe for a time” (Frank 1917/1949, 62). For Frank, the particular value of
Mach’s phenomenalist doctrines was that they helped foster a critical attitude
among scientists against science itself. This was essential to avoid succumbing
to a “new scientific scholasticism” that took science as a stock of definite and
final truths, thereby endangering the enlightenment-oriented project of sci-
ence (78).
Frank (1917/1949) addressed the threat of new “scientific” scholasticism
only in passing. At the end of the 1920s, when the Vienna Circle had estab-
lished itself as an important force in the struggle for philosophical and societal
progress in the German-speaking cultural sphere, this issue moved to the fore-
front. From then onward, Frank replaced the term “scholasticism” (originally
used in Frank 1917/1949) with “school philosophy” (“Schulphilosophie”), ap-
parently to emphasize the pejorative connotations associated with this expres-
sion. According to Frank, “school philosophy” was a widespread attitude among
scientists, philosophers, and others who were convinced of an erroneous and
reactionary idea of the role of science in modern society. One of the charac-
teristic features of such a world vision was the conviction that the capacities
of science were principally limited: “there are questions so profound that they
cannot be solved by the exact sciences. . . . Some believe that there is a special
method, the ‘philosophical,’ with the help of which such questions . . . can be
answered, while others regard these problems as forever insoluble, as ‘eternal
riddles’” (Frank 1930/1949, 91–92). Frank’s “school philosophy” was not nec-
essarily a sophisticated academic doctrine (as medieval scholasticism certainly
was). Quite often, “school philosophy” was a sort of common sense that pre-
tended to be philosophy:
21. Frank called the Vienna Circle the “shock troop [Stoßtrupp] of the anti-metaphysical science-
oriented movement” (1935, 4).
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It need not be supposed that one has to make any philosophical studies in
order to become acquainted with the world conception of school philos-
ophy. In all our knowledge that has come to us from the elementary school,
in all metaphors of our language, it is implicitly contained. Its presence is
not noticed because traditions, centuries old, make us take it for granted.
The pure “empiricist” uses it under the name “common sense.”Hence it is
no wonder that it is just the physicist opposed to speculation who is easily
inclined to the “ignorabimus” of du Bois-Reymond, with his surrender of
the scientific conception of nature. (Frank 1917/1949, 97)
In his contribution to the first volume of Erkenntnis, Frank characterized “school
philosophy” through its “truth theory” (1930/1949, 101). He frankly admitted
that he felt unable to present the basic ideas of “school philosophy” better than
Henri Bergson had in his introduction to the French translation of James’s
Pragmatism (1911/1997):
For the ancient philosophers there existed a world, raised above space and
time, in which all possible truths had dwelt since eternity. According to
these philosophers, the truth of human judgments was measured by the
degree to which they were faithful copies of those eternal truths. The
modern philosophers, to be sure, have brought down truth from heaven to
earth, but they still regard it as something that exists prior to our judg-
ments. A proposition such as “Heat expands a body,” according to them
would be a law of governing the facts: if not ruling over them, at least rul-
ing in their midst; a law actually contained in our experience; it remains
for us only to extract it from the latter. Even a philosophy like that of
Kant, which assumes that every scientific truth is such only in relation to
the human mind, considers the true propositions as given a priori by hu-
man experience. Once this experience, in general, is organized by human
thought, the whole work of science consists in breaking through the ob-
structing husk of facts, in the interior of which the truth is housed like a
nut in its shell. (Bergson 1911/1968, 14; cited in Frank 1930/1949, 95)
In modern terms, the approach Bergson and Frank describe here may be char-
acterized as a sort of “metaphysical realism.”22 According to this doctrine, there is
22. For both Carnap and Neurath, Bergson was a notorious metaphysician. In contrast, Frank
considered Bergson an authority for a correct characterization of school philosophy. This situation
points to a certain tension between the concepts of school philosophy in Frank’s sense and metaphysical
philosophy in Carnap’s or Neurath’s sense.
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a mind-independent world with a well-determined unique structure. The task
of science is to describe this structure as faithfully and precisely as possible,
thereby providing us with a true description of the world as it really is. Some
school philosophers despaired of this task and fell back on a resigned
Ignorabimus à la du Bois-Reymond. Others reached for an even worse escape
route, contending that there were other nonscientificmethods that allowed us to
go beyond the limits of scientific knowledge by tapping the sources of meta-
physics and religious revelation. Thus, school philosophy, in Frank’s sense,
could cover a wide variety of more or less metaphysically infected philosophical
positions, to describe it in logico-empiricist terms. All variants of school phi-
losophy agreed that truth was always to be conceived of as a discovery of
something “out there,” not as an invention of the cognizing subject engaged in
the process of knowledge production. As Bergson put it, school philosophers
contended that science (and perhaps also metaphysics) discovered truths as
Columbus had discovered America (Bergson 1911/1968, 15; see Frank 1930/
1949, 101).23
As Bergson had already observed, this “discovery theory” of scientific truth
was proposed by the more common sense–oriented version of school philoso-
phy, as well as by the more speculative variant of this philosophical current:
“This conception of truth appears natural to common sense as well as to phi-
losophy because it is natural to conceive of reality as a perfectly coherent and
systematizedwhole that has a logical structure. This structure would be the truth
itself; our science only rediscovers it” (Bergson 1911/1968, 14,my translation).24
Frank fully agreed with Bergson and approvingly quoted his recapitulation of
this idea on the following page: “It seems to me that one might summarize the
essence of the pragmatic conception of truth in a formula of the following kind:
Whereas for the other conceptions a new truth is a discovery, for pragmatism it is an
invention” (Bergson 1911/1968, 15; Frank 1949, 102). In his anti-school phi-
losophy manifesto of 1930, Frank mentioned three examples of the pernicious
consequences of the school-philosophical “truth theory”:
23. Isaiah Berlin cast the essential difference between classical and romanticist (i.e., modern) thought
in the dichotomy discovered versus invented: “The common assumption of the romantics . . . is that the
answers to the great questions are not to be discovered somuch as to be invented. They are not something
found, they are something literally made” (2001, 203). Indeed, ascribing to Frank a “romanticist”
understanding of science is not as far-fetched as onemay think at first sight. For instance, inContemporary
Science and the Contemporary World View, Frank asserted that “the main activity of science . . . consists in
the inventions of symbols and in the building of symbolic systems from which our experience can be
logically derived. This system is the work of our creative imagination. . . . The work of the scientist is
probably not fundamentally different form the work of the poet. . . . Science and all other types of
knowledge, including art, consist in building up systems of symbols” (1958, 62).
24. Frank resumed this idea much later in Frank (1950a) and Frank (1950b).
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1. The resigned attitude of those scientists and philosophers who ac-
cepted the Ignorabimus, according to which some important andmean-
ingful problems were principally unsolvable by scientific means and
therefore might have to be handed over to other, more powerful non-
scientific agencies. As we shall see, in its most virulent version, this atti-
tude might lead to the conviction that science had nothing to contrib-
ute to the solution of the really important problems. For their solution,
one had to rely instead on other, nonscientific, genuinely “philosophi-
cal” methods. Thus, highly metaphysical idealistic systems, such as
those of, say, Hegel and Schelling, could be subsumed under the label of
school-philosophical currents because they were based on the assump-
tion that “truth” could be found by nonscientific means. Another type
of metaphysical school philosophy, not addressed by Frank himself
(but by his fellow logical empiricist Neurath (see Neurath 1921/1973),
is represented by Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West (Spengler
1918/1991), which claimed to provide answers to a variety of profound
“morphological” questions concerning universal history that ordinary
sober historical research could not give.
2. The disdain for modern science and its fallible and limited methods
may lead partisans of school philosophy to a kind of intellectual lazi-
ness that allows them to maintain an outdated Aristotelian logic, al-
though this has turned out to be rather useless for most scientific and
other purposes.
3. The unconscious adherence to outdated school-philosophical doctrines
may lead to a misinterpretation of the new scientific world conception
in opposite realistic or idealist ways so that “it appeared not as the be-
ginning of a new scientific world conception but as a new fashionable
form of the school philosophy” (Frank 1930/1949, 100). Thus, un-
necessary quarrels and misunderstandings between philosophical cur-
rents might arise that actually share a common interest in scientific and
societal progress. For Frank, a case in point was Lenin’s savage attack
against “Machism” in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: Critical Re-
marks on a Reactionary Philosophy (Lenin 1909/1958), which he saw as
a misunderstanding caused by Lenin’s reading of Mach in a school-
philosophical way (see Frank 1930/1949; Frank 1949, 190).
Bergson’s just-quoted contention that “Kant’s philosophy . . . considers the
true propositions as given a priori by human experience” (Bergson 1911/1968,
14) may suggest that for him and Frank, neo-Kantian philosophers might have
been the best contemporary candidates for “school philosophers.” This choice,
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however, was problematic in that, at the turn of the twentieth century, those
philosophers had long since abandoned the fixed and apodictic Kantian a priori
that Bergson considered a characteristic mark of Kantian “school philosophy.”
Indeed, the Southwest neo-Kantian school of Rickert, as well as the Marburg
neo-Kantianism of Cohen, Natorp, and Cassirer, explicitly criticized the tra-
ditional Kantian a priori, to say nothing of any naive “copy theory” of scientific
knowledge, according to which science aimed at an accurate copy of the world
as it really is.
Frank never clearly distinguished between Kant’s philosophy and the vari-
ous currents of neo-Kantian philosophy. He recognized that Cassirer’s neo-
Kantianism had the merit of contributing to the “disintegration” (Zersetzung) of
school philosophy. Nevertheless, he accused Cassirer of never having aban-
doned school philosophy completely (see Frank 1938a/1949).
The influence of school philosophywas innoway restricted to theOldWorld,
however. As Frank, Carnap, and other logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle
had to experience firsthand, there was also no scarcity of “school philosophers”
in America.25 Representatives of a radical Thomist school philosophy, such as
Mortimer Adler, Robert Hutchins, and Jacques Maritain, challenged the au-
tonomy of science, contending that scientific knowledge was a lower kind of
knowledge, subordinated to theological and philosophical knowledge.
Perhaps the harshest attack of this kind was launched by Mortimer Adler
at the first Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Their Relation
to the Democratic Way of Life, which took place in New York in 1940. In his
notorious speech “God and the Professors,” Adler put forward the following
theses:
The essential point of [positivism] is simply the affirmation of science,
and the denial of philosophy and religion. . . . The professors, by and large,
are positivists. . . . The most serious threat to Democracy is the positivism
of the professors, which dominates every aspect of modern education and
is the central corruption ofmodern culture.Democracy hasmuchmore to
fear from the mentality of its teachers than from the nihilism of Hitler. It
is the same nihilism in both cases, but Hitler’s is more honest and con-
sistent, less blurred by subtleties and queasy qualifications, and hence less
dangerous. (1950, 72)
25. Carnap reported some of the more amusing experiences of this kind in his Intellectual Auto-
biography, particularly a lecture by Mortimer Adler at the philosophical department of the University of
Chicago in 1936 (see Carnap 1963, 39–42).
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The conference in New York was the first of a series of annual meetings of
teachers, sociologists, historians, philosophers, and scientists that continued
well into the 1950s. The aim of the conferences was to find answers to the
threats of totalitarianism and the apparent weaknesses of democracy that al-
legedly resulted from the “relativism” and “nihilism” ofmodern society.Many of
the participants, particularly neo-Thomists such as Adler, Hutchins, and oth-
ers, contended that excessive esteem for science was responsible for these defi-
ciencies. Frank, as one of the protagonists of these meetings, vigorously argued
against these contentions. He wanted to show that, on the contrary, the rela-
tivism of science had nothing to do with skepticism and agnosticism and that it
posed no threat to democratic and religious beliefs.26
Hence, one may say that in the United States, Frank’s bête noire “school phi-
losophy” acquired a clearer and sharper contour than it had in Europe. The
addressees of Frank’s attacks against school philosophy in America can be clearly
identified as neo-Thomist philosophers such as Adler, Hutchins, and Maritain.
These partisans of a “new medievalism,” as Sidney Hook characterized Adler’s
doctrine, wished to relegate the sciences to a subordinate place in their schema
of knowledge (see Hook 1950). According to this schema, the studies were hier-
archically ordered according to their intrinsic educational merits. The highest
rank was attributed to the knowledge of God (i.e., to theology), followed by the
knowledge of reason (i.e., the metaphysics of [school] philosophy) in the second
rank, with scientific knowledge relegated to the third and final rank.
One may say that in the United States, Frank made the discussion with
school philosophy a main point of his philosophical work. Whereas in the
1950s he seems to have given up the project of bringing back the (early)
Carnap to the fold of ( Jamesian) pragmatism, the issue of school philosophy
occupied a high rank on Frank’s agenda until the end of his career (see Frank
1950a, 1950b, 1954/1961, 1957/1962).27
As a result of his many discussions with philosophers, sociologists, and other
nonscientists and as one of the protagonists of the Conferences on Science,
Philosophy, and Religion, Frank seems to have concluded that the traditional,
brusque, logical-empiricist rejection of metaphysics as a heap of meaningless
“pseudo-sentences” did not suffice to fully understand this societal and cultural
phenomenon. As we shall see in section 6, this insight profoundly influenced
the last phase of Frank’s philosophy of science, when he was engaged in the
26. In the first part of his booklet Relativity—a Richer Truth (Frank 1950b), the reader may find a
summary of his interventions from 1940 to 1949.
27. Frank’s intense occupation with school philosophy even had the absurd consequence that one
of his less benevolent critics accused him of having converted to Thomism (see Kegley 1959; Rutherford
1960).
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elaboration of the conception of philosophy of science as “a link between
science and philosophy.” Before this issue is treated in detail, however, it seems
appropriate to take a closer look at Frank’s relation to American pragmatists.
5. Frank’s Project in the Context of American Pragmatism
It is well known that pragmatism is not a monolithic doctrine. Already at the
beginning of the twentieth century, A. O. Lovejoy had argued that there were at
least 13 different pragmatisms (see Lovejoy 1908a, 1908b). This classification
may be too fine-grained to be useful, but it may be taken as evidence that dif-
ferent philosophical currents were sailing under the flag of pragmatism (see
Mounce 1997; Misak 2013). Frank was never interested in these subtleties. For
him, pragmatism meant a (watered-down) version of James’s pragmatism. He
never mentioned C. I. Lewis, and he mentioned Peirce and Dewey only in pass-
ing (see Frank 1950a, 1950b, 1957/1962). In particular, he never discussed
the discrepancies between, for instance, James’s and Peirce’s pragmatisms. He
painted the relation between logical empiricism and pragmatism with a simi-
larly broad brush, where the former might be understood as a logically refined
version of the latter: “In contrast to the method of pragmatism, however, they
[the logical empiricists] not only tried to characterize the system of science in a
general and somewhat indefinite way by saying that the system is an instrument
to be invented and constructed in order to find one’s way among experiences,
but also—and instead—they investigated the structure and the construction of
this instrument. The investigation took place through an analysis of the method
by which physics orders experiences through a mathematical system of formu-
las” (Frank 1930/1949, 105). This account of the relation between logical em-
piricism and pragmatism ignored fundamental discrepancies between the two
currents. Moreover, it did not consider the possibility that logical empiricism
might suffer from certain deficiencies that did not plague pragmatism.28 Already
in the times of Mach and James, the relations between positivism and pragma-
tism were not without problems: James was at pains to dissociate his prag-
matism from Mach’s positivism, whereas Mach regarded much of James’s
pragmatism dealing with ethics and religion as romantic metaphysics. Frank
never addressed these disputes; he never elaborated what was to be under-
stood precisely by the “logical improvement of the ideas of Mach and James”
that logical empiricism had allegedly brought about.
28. From the side of American pragmatism, a more elaborate assessment of the strong and weak
points of the two currents may be found in Morris (1937; see also Mormann 2016).
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Already in 1911, James had vigorously protested against the thesis that “prag-
matism was only a re-editing of positivism.” For him, this was just “the first
misunderstanding” (of no less than eight) from which pragmatists suffered (see
James 1911/1997, 182).
With respect to his own philosophical position, Frank pursued a double-
pronged strategy. On one hand, he presented himself as a member of the logical
empiricist camp and availed himself of the higher reputation logical empiricists
enjoyed in matters of logical sophistication and precision. On the other hand,
in his own philosophical work, he did not always feel obliged to comply with
the logical-empiricist standards of precision and logicality.29 Formal precision
and philosophical sophistication did not play a preeminent role for him, as var-
ious critics observed (see Toulmin 1951; Putnam 1958).30
Thus, the relevance of Frank’s “Austro-American” reading of the Aufbau does
not primarily reside in its philosophical precision and subtlety. Rather, its main
merit is that it pointed toward a broader issue, namely, the problem of the re-
lation between the logical empiricists and their “kindred spirits” the American
pragmatists (see Frank 1949, 33).
Frank’s “programmatic retrospectives” were attempts to strengthen the ties
between Austrian logical empiricism and American pragmatism to further the
project of a modern, enlightenment-oriented, comprehensive scientific philos-
ophy (Frank 1941, 1949). By presenting the Aufbau as an essentially pragmatist
work, he might have hoped to win new American readers by showing that one
of the key texts of logical empiricism had a genuine affinity to pragmatism.
Moreover, the author of the Aufbau might have been persuaded to invest more
work in the project of fostering the collaboration between logical empiricists
29. For instance, he accepted without qualms Bergson’s account of school philosophy’s theory of
truth. Peirce’s logically sophisticated semiotic pragmatism was never considered by Frank, although at
the First International Congress for the Unity of Science in Paris in 1935 (which Frank attended),
Morris had noted the relevance of Peirce for a “scientific” empiricism as follows: “A distinguishing
tendency of contemporary empiricism is the great interest in the formal sciences of logic and mathe-
matics. One immediately thinks, among others, of the names Peirce, Russell, Hilbert, Lukasiewicz,
Lewis, Carnap, Tarski. . . . It is significant that many empiricists have adopted mathematical logic as a
tool for logical analysis. [The scientific empiricists] wish to integrate the formal sciences within an
empiricism wide enough to include observation of the manipulation of symbols . . . grounding [thereby]
formal logic and mathematics upon a general theory of signs. . . . The most important steps [in this
direction] have been made by Charles Peirce” (1936, 48–49). Frank could hardly be considered a
representative of this “distinguishing tendency of contemporary empiricism.”
30. For instance, for a hard-boiled logical empiricist such as Carnap, Frank’s ample references to
Bergson may have appeared somewhat strange.
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and their pragmatist fellow philosophers. Both enterprises failed. The American
public was not much impressed by Carnap’s allegedly pragmatist pedigree, and
Carnap did not feel inclined to invest greater efforts to render the pragmatist
features of his approach more visible.31
After World War II, the project of developing a working alliance between
pragmatism and logical empiricism began to flounder, at least in the opinion of
many pragmatists and logical empiricists (see Uebel 2003). For instance, C. I.
Lewis contended that there had been a greater affinity of American pragmatism
to the earlier logical empiricism than to the latter:
In . . . the early documents of the neopositivists—particularly in Carnap’s
Der logische Aufbau der Welt . . . I found an empiricism and an analytic
method which were congenial to my own persuasions. I still find them
so. But if the younger and present protagonists of neopositivism should
re-read these, I think that they might be a little startled, not only by the
overlapping of them with pragmatic empiricism but also by the extent of
their own removal from this first phase of the movement. . . . But when
the phenomenal analysis of the Aufbau, squarely based on direct expe-
rience . . . became replaced by physicalism . . . and any retained em-
piricism became reduced to a semantic ghost of direct experience—pro-
tocol or observations statements—my sense of the congenial suffered a
like attenuation. (1968, 664)
Although both Frank and Lewis saw affinities between the Aufbau and
pragmatism, theydidnot refer to the same features ofCarnap’swork.Lewis (since
1936) had contended that Carnap’s sketched constitution of values by “value
experiences” gave them an empirical content that was as definite as that of other
(physical) qualities (see Lewis 1936/1970, 153). For Lewis, this analogy between
the verifiability of judgments of facts and that of judgments of value provided a
common ground among pragmatists and the members of the Vienna Circle on
which a common edifice could be built. Regrettably, as with Lewis, the logical
empiricists, particularly Carnap, later abandoned this common ground.
For Frank, the affinity of the Aufbau with pragmatism did not reside in
the common conviction that value judgments were empirically meaningful, of
course, but rather in their closely related truth theories, both of which con-
sidered nonverifiable assertions meaningless (see sec. 2). Nevertheless, Lewis
31. After all, the Aufbau was published in English only in 1963.
Mormann | SP R ING 2017
000
This content downloaded from 158.227.191.004 on April 09, 2017 03:07:55 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
and Frank agreed that the Carnap of the 1940s had moved away from his ear-
lier, “more pragmatist” logical empiricism.32
In a different way than Lewis, Dewey also diagnosed Carnap’s persistent
inclination of strictly separating the domains of the “emotive” and the “scientific”
as evidence for a basically nonpragmatic attitude that evaded the real practical
problems: “The hard-and-fast impassible line which is supposed by some to ex-
ist between the ‘emotive’ and ‘scientific’ language is a reflex of the gap that exists
between the intellectual and the emotional in human relations and activities. . . .
The practical problem that has to be faced is the establishment of cultural con-
ditions that will support the kinds of behavior in which emotion and ideas,
desires and appraisals are integrated” (1944, 444–45). In light of Frank’s later
work (see Frank 1950a, 1950b, 1954/1961, 1957/1962), it seems plausible to
assume that he might have agreed with Dewey’s diagnosis. For the later Frank, it
was clear that a comprehensive theory of science, to overcome a too narrowly
conceived purely epistemological perspective, had to consider science a subsys-
tem of society. This entailed that scientific theories should and could be vali-
dated not only by internal criteria of correctness or simplicity, for example, but
also by their general usefulness to human society: “Only in this way can sci-
ence as a human activity be ‘scientifically’ understood and the gap between the
scientific and the humanistic aspect can be abridged [sic]” (Frank 1954/1961,
26). In his contribution to the Schilpp volume dedicated to Carnap, Frank ex-
plicitly diagnosed a lack of pragmatism inCarnap’s approach (seeFrank1963). In
extensively quoting the Marxist philosopher Brushinsky, he criticized Carnap
for having made use of “three metaphysical creeds: idealism, formalism and
mechanism” (Frank 1963, 164). Carnap, in his reply to “Philipp Frank and
V. Brushlinsky,” testily admitted that “the pragmatic component has so far not
been sufficiently investigated by our movement, although its importance has
been acknowledged theoretically by me and by empiricists in general” (1963,
868).33 However, beyond the theoretical recognition of a pragmatic deficit of the
movement, Carnap did not make any real effort to improve this situation. Thus,
in the last years of his career, Frank was increasingly on his own in this respect.
Nevertheless, in his last book, Philosophy of Science as a Link between Science and
Philosophy (Frank 1957/1962), and related work, one finds new and original
32. Richard Creath even went so far as to assert that Lewis “hated the logical empiricists” (1995,
288). This might be a slight exaggeration. Nevertheless, Lewis certainly disliked the later Carnap’s
“empiricism” as it had evolved in America.
33. To be sure, the issue of the pragmatist character of Carnap’s later philosophy is by no means
settled. Recently, Richardson (2007) and Uebel (2013) argued that Carnap’s later account may be
characterized as essentially pragmatist. Others argue that key ingredients for a genuine pragmatism in
Carnap are missing (see Mormann 2007).
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ideas concerning the place of science inmodern democratic societies. This will be
the topic of the following section.
6. Philosophy of Science as a Link between Science and Philosophy
In Frank’s last book, the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle, particularly
Carnap’s Aufbau, is not mentioned at all, and Bergson and James are only
mentioned in passing (Frank 1957/1962).34 Frank no longer seemed to be in-
terested in building bridges between European logical empiricism and Amer-
ican pragmatism, at least not primarily. Instead, we see him engaged in the am-
bitious task of sketching a novel account of philosophy of science that conceived
it as the “missing link” between science and philosophy (see Frank 1957/1962,
xv). This novel philosophy of science went beyond science proper as it was un-
derstood by the traditional logicist empiricism:
We need a full understanding of the principles of physics or biology, an
understanding not only of logical argument but also of psychological and
sociological laws; briefly, we need to complement the science of physical
nature by the science of man. . . . In order to understand not only science
itself but also the place of science in our civilization, its relation to ethics,
politics, and religion, we need a coherent system of concepts and laws,
within which the natural sciences, as well as philosophy and the human-
ities, have their place. Such a systemmay be called “philosophy of science,”
it would be the “missing link” between the sciences and the humanities. (3)
Frankwaswell aware that the newphilosophy of science envisaged by himwas
not the only candidate for connecting science with the broader concerns of a
democratic society. In the introduction to Frank (1957/1962), he mentioned as
other competitors for this job a (Thomistic) philosophia perennis and dialectical
materialism. For him, the decisive disadvantage of those options was that they
could be upheld only by authorities (i.e., by the church or the party), which
would have jeopardized democracy proper (see Frank 1957/1962, xv).
As a concrete example of the need to take into account more than purely
scientific aspects in the discussion on scientific matters, Frank mentioned the
problem of finding criteria to decide in a rational and responsible way which
34. This is not to say that Carnap had fallen completely out of Frank’s philosophical horizon.
Rather, instead of praising the pragmatist virtues of the Aufbau in this book, Frank argued that Carnap’s
inductive logic may be considered the core of a pragmatic decision theory (see Frank 1957/1962, 327–
40).
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theory one should choose among different candidates: “The problem of de-
ciding between different theories of the physical sciences cannot be solved
within these sciences if we have to do with theories of high generality. New lines
of research arise for the scientist who wants to achieve a real understanding of
his science. We are guided into the wide field which embraces science as a part
of human behavior in general. We may speak of a ‘sociology of science’ or of the
‘humanistic background of science’ if we want to give these new fields a frame
of reference in our traditional parlance” (1957/1962, 359). These were new
tones to the ears of the more traditional (empiricist) philosophers of science,
perhaps too new; there were not many who wanted to listen to them. Indeed,
Frank’s later work was generally received rather negatively by the community of
philosophers of science (see Howard 2003; Reisch 2005). For instance, Stephen
Toulmin, in his review of Relativity—a Richer Truth (Frank 1950b), sarcastically
proposed as an appropriate subtitle for this book “Logical Empiricism Told to
Children” (Toulmin 1951, 181). Toulmin’s criticism was unfair insofar as Rel-
ativity was directed at the general public and not professional analytic phi-
losophers.35 Frank’s last book,Philosophy of Science: The Link between Science and
Philosophy (1957/1962), was dismissed even more harshly by Putnam, who
bluntly disqualified it as obsolete: “Professor Frank’s knowledge of the issues
that concern philosophers of science . . . is thirty years out of date. Anyone who
still thinks that the issue in philosophy of science is between ‘operational defi-
nition’ and ‘metaphysical interpretation’might enjoy reading the book. After-
wards he should learn some real philosophy of science” (1958, 750).
Putnam completely ignored Frank’s attempts to overcome the narrow con-
fines of traditional philosophy of science and to formulate a sociologically and
politically more comprehensive perspective that explicitly considered science
a subsystem of society and aimed to elucidate the “humanistic background of
science.”
The ultimate motivation of his new approach may, perhaps, be found in the
intense discussions he had with the varied audiences at the already-mentioned
Conferences on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Their Relation to the
Democratic Way of Life (see sec. 4). Due to this experience, it seems, Frank
came to the conclusion that the most convincing way of arguing for a com-
prehensive “scientific world conception” was not to dismiss “metaphysics” sim-
ply as meaningless nonsense. Rather, science, metaphysics (aka philosophy), and
35. Indeed, Relativity was an enriched and elaborated reedition of contributions and comments
Frank had made to the series of Conferences on Science, Philosophy, and Religion that took place in the
1940s and 1950s. For a more recent sympathetic and uncritical interpretation of Frank’s book, see
Nemeth (2003).
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common sense all had to be recognized as important ingredients that had an
influence on the factual worldviews pursued in modern societies. According
to the later Frank, it was not to be expected that, in favor of a fully scientific
world conception, the philosophical (metaphysical) and commonsensical ele-
ments could be eliminated in one fell swoop. Rather, following the French
mathematician and philosopher Édouard Le Roy (1899–1900), Frank insisted
that one had to acknowledge a kind of “dialectic” between science, common
sense, and philosophy: “Science departs from common sense and does not join
it in its development as science proper. Thus science by itself does not close
the cycle of knowledge and does not realize the unity of knowledge. Science
needs therefore a prolongation and this will be philosophy. . . in one way science
itself is a prolongation of common sense. Common sense, science, philosophy,
common sense form a cycle” (Frank 1947/1949, 299; Frank 1957/1962, 47). To
historically explain this “cycle,” in the opening chapter of Philosophy of Science
Frank told a story of the expulsion from a paradise when science, philosophy,
and common sense still lived in harmony. In broad terms, it went like this: “In
ancient and medieval science, science and philosophy were part of one chain of
thought and not distinguished from one another. One end of this chain touched
the ground—directly knowable observations. The chain connected them with
the other, more lofty end—the intelligible principles” (Frank 1957/1962, 10). In
those times, the requirements for checking general principles against observed
facts were not very strict. This situation gradually changed in modern times.
Instead of relying on vague but intelligible and plausible principles, modern
science became based on intermediate, precise principles that were usually in-
telligible neither by common sense nor by philosophy. It was considered the task
of philosophy to connect scientific principles with common sense (see Frank
1957/1962, 46). This connection was to be achieved by a kind of metaphysical
translation of the scientific principles that rendered them plausible for com-
mon sense. Thus, the principles became analogous to the laws of everyday ex-
perience (see Frank 1947/1949, 298). A dangerous consequence of the trans-
lation of scientific principles into common sense principles is that they lose their
hypothetical and, thus, their scientific character. They take on the same al-
legedly apodictic character as commonsense principles: “To interpret the prin-
ciples of science as results of our common sense leads to the opinion that they
are self-evident and cannot be refuted by further empirical checking. This belief
is the very core of the metaphysical interpretation of science” (286). This situ-
ation may lead to a petrification of scientific knowledge. “Petrified” scientific
knowledge may become the basis for new irrefutable pseudo-religious convic-
tions because the metaphysical translation of scientific principles into common-
sense principles does not do justice to the dynamic and fallible character of sci-
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entific knowledge: “What we call in a vague sense ‘common sense’ is actually an
older system of science which was dropped because new discoveries demanded
a new conceptual scheme, a new language of science. Therefore the attempt
to interpret scientific principles by ‘common sense’means actually an attempt
to formulate our actual science by the conceptual scheme that was adequate to
an older stage of science, now abandoned” (301). Here is not the place to dis-
cuss the shortcomings and obscurities of Frank’s account of the complex “cyclic”
relation among science, philosophy, and common sense. I think it is more im-
portant to recognize that Frank was right in emphasizing that science was not a
problem of science alone but that it involved other factors and required con-
sideration of perspectives other than those that were on the agenda of the tra-
ditional logico-empiricist philosophy of science. In hindsight, the easy dismissal
that Putnam, Toulmin, and other critics applied to Frank’s embryonic “socially
engaged philosophy of science” was too hasty. Today, we understand that phi-
losophy of science did not benefit from the exodus to the “icy slopes of logic.”
Only much later did the issue of a “socially engaged philosophy of science
(SEPOS),” which Frank had already pursued in the 1950s, reappear on the
agenda of the discipline (see, e.g., Cartieri and Potochnik 2014). The prospects
of this new perspective on philosophy of science are described optimistically
by Cartieri and Potochnik as follows: “We are optimistic that SEPOS is emerg-
ing from shifting attitudes in philosophy of science. After a long period of social
and political disengagement, the field and its participants are taking steps
to assert the availability of philosophy of science as a public resource” (2014,
914). As classical forerunners of such a socially engaged philosophy of science
(“SEPOS”), these authors mention Reichenbach, Carnap, and Neurath—Frank
is not mentioned at all.
7. Concluding Remarks
With respect to logical acuity and historico-philosophical scholarship, Frank’s
Austro-American empiricism, particularly his interpretation of the Aufbau, can-
not compete with other philosophically more sophisticated interpretations of
logical empiricist thought. The philosophical content of the Aufbau is richer
than Frank realized, and there are many other philosophical, cultural, and sci-
entific factors that influenced Carnap’s logical empiricism beyond Mach’s mo-
nism, Poincaré’s conventionalism, and James’s pragmatism. Moreover, Frank’s
interpretation of these philosophical currents was certainly not free from mis-
understandings and simplifications. This does not imply, however, that Frank’s
“programmatic” interpretation should be dismissed without further consider-
ations. Rather, his Austro-American account of logical empiricism remains im-
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portant because it put an important issue on the agenda of (the history of )
philosophy of science, namely, the task of understanding the complex relations
between the European logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and American
pragmatism in the first half of the twentieth century. This will certainly remain
a central theme of (the history of) philosophy of science for some time to come.
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